Resistance is Not Always Futile

What Slovakia, South Korea, Guatemala, and Malawi can teach us about fighting back—before it’s too late.

Democratic backsliding – the erosion of checks and balances, civil liberties, and fair elections by incumbents – can often be halted or even reversed when citizens mobilize early in defense of democratic norms. In several notable cases around the world, popular resistance movements have successfully pushed back against autocratic actions before authoritarian rule could fully entrench itself.

This article examines four such case studies – Slovakia (1998), South Korea (1987), Guatemala (2015), and Malawi (2011–2012) – highlighting the context of the backsliding, the nature of the civic resistance, the outcomes achieved, and key lessons identified by experts. Each example underscores how timely collective action, sometimes aided by international pressure, safeguarded democracy at a critical juncture.

A protest in Korea in June 1987

Slovakia (1998): Ousting Mečiar’s Illiberal Regime

Background

In the mid-1990s, Slovakia’s fledgling democracy veered toward authoritarianism under Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar. From 1993 to 1998, Slovakia was classified as an “illiberal” or “competitive authoritarian” regime​. Mečiar and his ruling party concentrated power by undermining democratic checks and balances – seizing control of key institutions and flouting constitutional constraints.

Notoriously, his government engaged in “tyranny of the majority” tactics: disregarding the president’s authority, violating the constitution, obstructing a referendum on direct presidential elections, and excluding the opposition from oversight of security services and state media​. This aggressive, anti-democratic style (dubbed “Mečiarism”) was marked by winner-takes-all governance, intimidation of critics (branded “anti-state” or “anti-Slovak”), and pervasive clientelism​. By 1997, Slovakia had become internationally isolated – deemed the “black hole in the heart of Europe” by U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright – as Mečiar’s policies jeopardized Slovakia’s prospects for European Union and NATO integration​.

Popular Resistance

Civil society in Slovakia responded with an unprecedented campaign to defend democracy in the lead-up to the 1998 elections. A consolidated platform of 35 NGOs formed the Civic Campaign ’98 (known as OK ‘98 – Občianska kampaň ‘98) to promote free and fair elections​. This non-partisan coalition waged a creative grassroots effort to educate and empower voters.

Volunteers organized public debates, concerts, community events and disseminated informational materials to boost citizens’ awareness of the stakes​. Crucially, OK ’98 also trained independent election monitors and encouraged high voter turnout. The campaign explicitly aimed to make democratic participation “fun and not just a duty,” in order to energize voters disillusioned by Mečiar’s rule.

Thanks to these efforts, voter turnout surged to a record 84% in the September 1998 parliamentary elections​. International observers deemed the election legitimate, and Slovak voters seized the moment to change course.

Outcome

The results marked a democratic milestone. Mečiar’s populist HZDS party, despite finishing first, failed to secure a governing majority and was ousted from power, replaced by a pro-democratic coalition led by opposition leader Mikuláš Dzurinda​. In other words, Slovak citizens – empowered by civil society – peacefully voted out a semi-authoritarian regime. This pivotal election ended years of illiberal deviation and set Slovakia back on a path toward democracy and rule of law​.

With Mečiar gone, the new government enacted rapid political and economic reforms and re-engaged with the West. Slovakia went from being a pariah to qualifying for entry into NATO and the EU in the subsequent years​. Observers often cite OK ‘98 as an early success story in “reclaiming democracy” through civic action.

Additionally, U.S. and EU diplomatic pressure (conditioning Slovakia’s EU/NATO prospects on democratic behavior) had helped curb Mečiar’s excesses and facilitate the transition​. Scholars James Bunce and Sharon Wolchik, studying post-communist “electoral revolutions,” conclude that Slovakia’s 1998 campaign fostered a “climate of optimism” among citizens that their votes could bring change – a crucial ingredient for its success​.

The OK ’98 model of broad civic mobilization would go on to inspire similar pro-democracy movements in Croatia (2000), Serbia (2000), and other countries seeking to reverse authoritarian trends.

South Korea (1987): “People Power” Ends Decades of Dictatorship

Background

South Korea in the 1980s was still under entrenched authoritarian rule. General Park Chung-hee had ruled as a dictator from the 1960s until his assassination in 1979, having imposed the draconian Yushin Constitution to extend his power indefinitely​. After Park’s demise, another military general, Chun Doo-hwan, seized power in a 1979 coup and brutally crushed a pro-democracy uprising in Gwangju in May 1980 (killing hundreds of civilians)​.

Throughout the 1980s, Chun’s regime maintained martial law–style repression: political opposition was suppressed, press freedoms curtailed, and demands for democratic reform were met with state violence​. By early 1987, Chun was nearing the end of his presidential term but refused to allow the restoration of direct presidential elections (which had been suspended under the dictatorship).

In April 1987, he announced that the constitution would not be amended for democratization – a clear signal that the ruling circle intended to perpetuate its rule. Around the same time, public outrage was growing over the regime’s abuses, intensified by the death of a student activist named Park Jong-cheol under police torture (January 1987) and the fatal shooting of another protester, Lee Han-yeol, by tear gas in June. These events became catalysts for a broad-based democracy movement.

Popular Resistance

In June 1987, South Koreans launched what became known as the June Democratic Uprising. Over the course of 19 days (June 10–29), millions of people from all walks of life poured into the streets across the country to demand an end to military dictatorship and the introduction of free and fair elections. Protesters spanning students, labor unions, religious leaders, and middle-class citizens formed an unprecedented coalition united by the single goal of democracy​.

Massive demonstrations, rallies, and marches took place in Seoul and other cities daily, even in the face of tear gas and police crackdowns. These nationwide protests were notably peaceful in character despite their scale – citizens famously waved Korean flags and sang together, transforming city plazas into arenas of nonviolent resistance. The movement’s core demand was the direct election of the next president (rather than another hand-picked successor of Chun) and broad constitutional reforms to guarantee civil liberties.

As the rallies grew, business owners, professionals, and even media outlets began voicing support, signaling a consensus that the old regime’s time was up. The “networks of contention” forged between student activists, church groups, and opposition politicians enabled the sustained mobilization of crowds even under high-risk conditions​.

Outcome

Facing relentless popular pressure, the authoritarian ruling elite finally gave way. On June 29, 1987, Chun’s chosen successor and ruling-party leader, Roh Tae-woo, went on national television to announce the regime’s capitulation to the protesters’ demands. In this historic June 29 Declaration, Roh promised sweeping democratic reforms – including amending the constitution to allow direct presidential elections, restoring civil liberties like freedom of speech, and granting amnesty to political dissidents​.

These concessions effectively opened the door to a transition. A new democratic constitution was swiftly drafted and approved by the legislature, and in December 1987 South Korea held its first genuinely competitive presidential election in decades. While Roh Tae-woo himself narrowly won that election (helped by a split in the opposition vote), the significance was clear: the country’s leaders could now only come to power via the ballot box. South Korea had formally ushered in its Sixth Republic, ending 26 years of uninterrupted authoritarian rule.

This victory against backsliding – or in this case, against longstanding autocracy – is widely regarded as a landmark in the global Third Wave of democratization. South Korea went on to consolidate a vibrant democracy in subsequent years, and scholars often cite 1987 as a prime example of how determined “people power” can force an authoritarian regime to negotiate and reform. In retrospect, the June Uprising demonstrated the importance of broad societal coalitions: it was the alliance of students, workers, intellectuals, and middle-class citizens that gave the movement its unstoppable momentum. As one analysis noted, South Korea “earned its hard-won spot as one of the biggest success stories” of the Third Wave​, showing that even hardline regimes can be compelled to yield if popular mobilization is vast and unified enough. The country’s democratic transition in 1987 has since been studied as a model of successful resistance, underscoring how protest can contribute to democratic consolidation.

Guatemala (2015): Mass Protests Against High-Level Corruption

Background

By the 2010s, Guatemala’s democracy was under strain from deep-rooted corruption and impunity in the state. Former general Otto Pérez Molina had been elected president in 2011 on promises to bolster security and integrity, but his government soon became mired in scandal. In early 2015, an investigation by the UN-backed International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) – an independent anti-corruption body – unveiled a massive corruption scheme known as “La Línea.” This scheme involved top officials orchestrating a customs fraud ring that siphoned off import duties in exchange for bribes. In April 2015, CICIG publicly implicated dozens of officials, including President Pérez Molina and Vice President Roxana Baldetti, as key players in the conspiracy​. The revelations made clear that the country’s highest office was abusing power for illicit gain, undermining the rule of law. At the time, Pérez Molina’s administration was also accused of intimidating investigators and attempting to weaken CICIG’s mandate, raising fears of a slide back into unchecked, autocratic governance​. This blatant corruption at the top – in a country still recovering from decades of military rule and civil war – set the stage for an extraordinary civic response.

Popular Resistance

Outraged by the exposure of official graft, Guatemalan citizens launched peaceful mass protests throughout the summer of 2015. What started as small gatherings swelled into a sustained movement often referred to as “Guatemala’s Spring.” Week after week, tens of thousands of Guatemalans from diverse backgrounds converged in Guatemala City’s central plaza and other urban centers, chanting “¡Renuncia Ya!” (“Resign Now!”)​.

These demonstrations were notable for their breadth and unity: students, businesspeople, indigenous groups, urban middle-class families, and even previously apolitical citizens all took part, fed up with the ruling party’s impunity​. Protesters waved national flags, painted their faces with the blue-and-white of Guatemala’s flag, and held creative rallies (including pot-banging “cacerolazo” protests) to keep the movement momentum high. Importantly, the protests remained peaceful and non-violent, which helped them grow in legitimacy and size.

Each passing week brought more pressure, with slogans focusing on anti-corruption and the defense of democracy. The persistent public outcry also emboldened Guatemala’s press and civil society groups to speak out more forcefully. By August 2015, the swelling protests – combined with mounting evidence from the CICIG investigation – created a crisis of legitimacy for Pérez Molina’s government. The business sector and opposition politicians withdrew their support for the president, and the attorney general moved to strip Pérez Molina of his immunity from prosecution.

Outcome

The citizens’ resolve paid off. In late August 2015, Guatemala’s Congress unanimously voted to revoke Pérez Molina’s immunity, clearing the way for criminal charges. Facing inevitable impeachment and arrest, President Pérez Molina resigned on September 3, 2015, becoming the first Guatemalan head of state to step down due to popular pressure over corruption​. He was promptly arrested; Vice President Baldetti had already been jailed months earlier on related charges.

These resignations marked a stunning victory for the protest movement – a sitting president was forced out mid-term by peaceful civic action, not by a coup or external intervention. Observers called it a “landmark in Guatemala’s journey to democracy,” as the justice system showed it could hold even the nation’s most powerful figures accountable. A caretaker government oversaw new elections in late 2015, which were won by an outsider reformist candidate.

In the aftermath, international commentators hailed the Guatemalan people for rejecting corruption and defending democratic norms. The head of the Open Society Justice Initiative noted that CICIG and the protesters together had “punctured the veil of impunity” that had reigned for decades​. It spurred new civic initiatives – for example, intellectuals and activists from the protests later formed the Movimiento Semilla (Seed Movement) party to continue pushing anti-corruption reforms​.

Lessons Learned

Analysts emphasize that Guatemala’s experience shows the power of broad-based, non-violent mobilization against kleptocracy. Support from institutions like CICIG and a free press provided the credible evidence and coverage that sustained public outrage. However, experts also caution that initial victories need consolidation. In Guatemala’s case, the euphoria of 2015 was followed by some democratic backsliding – a subsequent president (Jimmy Morales) expelled CICIG in 2019 and stalled reforms, illustrating the risk of regression​. Still, the 2015 protests left an enduring legacy in galvanizing a new generation of pro-democracy advocates. International organizations (such as the OAS and Freedom House) cite Guatemala 2015 as proof that even in countries with weak institutions, citizen activism can check executive abuses and revive accountability, at least in the short term.

Malawi (2011–2012): Civil Society Confronts an Authoritarian Drift

Background

In the late 2000s, Malawi – a small southern African democracy – began to show signs of democratic backsliding under President Bingu wa Mutharika. Initially praised for economic growth, Mutharika’s leadership took an autocratic turn during his second term (2009–2012). He concentrated power in the presidency and cracked down on dissent: critics accused him of silencing independent media and undermining institutional checks. By 2011, the administration had enacted laws to ban publications deemed contrary to the “public interest” and required protest organizers to deposit exorbitant sums (around $15,000) with the police as a condition for holding demonstrations​ – effectively deterring anti-government rallies.

Opposition voices, including Vice President Joyce Banda (whom Mutharika had estranged and expelled from the ruling party), were harassed or sidelined. International partners grew alarmed. In April 2011, a leaked diplomatic cable from Malawi’s former colonial ruler, the UK, described Mutharika as “becoming ever more autocratic and intolerant of criticism,” citing his assaults on media and civil society​. When this cable became public, Mutharika angrily expelled the British High Commissioner, prompting the UK to suspend about $30 million of aid to Malawi’s budget.

This aid freeze exacerbated Malawi’s economic woes: the country was already suffering severe fuel shortages, foreign exchange scarcity, high inflation, and unemployment, partly due to Mutharika’s mismanagement. By mid-2011, daily life for many Malawians had become a struggle, and frustration with the regime’s corruption and incompetence was boiling over. A broad alliance of civil society groups began to organize to demand political change.

Popular Resistance

In July 2011, Malawi experienced its largest anti-government protests since the introduction of multiparty democracy in 1994. A coalition of over 80 civil society organizations – including human rights NGOs, church groups, and student associations – coordinated nationwide demonstrations for July 20, 2011. These groups (operating under an umbrella platform often called the “July 20 Movement”) rallied citizens to protest the worsening economic conditions and governance abuses. The protesters’ grievances ranged from fuel and electricity shortages to repressive laws and graft.

Crowds took to the streets in all three regions of the country. In the cities of Blantyre, Lilongwe, Mzuzu, and others, thousands marched carrying signs calling for President Mutharika to “Respect Democracy” or even to “Step Down.” What began as peaceful marches, however, met a brutal response. Authorities had tried to stop the protests beforehand – a court issued an injunction to ban the demonstrations, which organizers defied​. When people proceeded to rally, police and army units deployed tear gas and live ammunition in an attempt to disperse the crowds.

The confrontation turned violent in some areas; demonstrators, enraged by the crackdown, burned ruling party offices and clashed with security forces. Over two days of unrest, at least 18 people were killed and dozens injured as a result of the security forces’ live fire and beatings. This was a shocking turn in a country known until then for its peaceful politics. Yet, rather than quelling dissent, the regime’s heavy-handed tactics galvanized further criticism.

The coalition of NGOs leading the protests decried Mutharika’s government as an “autocratic kleptocracy” and pointed out that Malawi was facing its worst governance crisis in decades. Despite the risks, civil society leaders persisted. They compiled a petition of 20 demands (ranging from economic reforms to restoration of media freedoms) and gave the president a 60-day ultimatum to respond, while planning for further nationwide protests if the demands were not met.

Outcome

The aftermath of the July 2011 protests put Mutharika on the defensive, both domestically and internationally. The African Union, United Nations, and various donor governments condemned the violence against unarmed protesters. Internally, influential groups – such as the Malawi Law Society and opposition parties – backed the civil society coalition’s calls for dialogue. Facing mounting pressure, President Mutharika grudgingly initiated a “National Dialogue” with some civil society representatives in August 2011, though this was largely seen as a stalling tactic.

Throughout late 2011, sporadic demonstrations and vigils continued (one university activist was mysteriously killed, fueling further anger). Mutharika’s popularity plummeted as fuel shortages increased and governance did not improve. Ultimately, a dramatic turn of events in April 2012 resolved the standoff: President Mutharika died suddenly of a heart attack on April 5, 2012.

This unexpected development tested Malawi’s constitutional stability. Some of Mutharika’s loyalists initially hesitated to transfer power to Vice President Joyce Banda (given that she had become his critic), leading to a brief constitutional crisis​. However, the military, judiciary, and much of the cabinet stood by the rule of law. Within 48 hours, Joyce Banda was sworn in as President in accordance with the constitution, making her Malawi’s first female head of state. “As you can see, the constitution prevails,” Banda declared, flanked by the army and police chiefs – an affirmation that the legal democratic order held firm​. President Banda swiftly moved to reverse many of her predecessor’s policies: she repealed restrictive laws, reopened dialogue with civil society, and restored relations with international donors (who resumed financial aid). These actions helped stabilize the economy and reopen political space, steering Malawi back toward a more democratic path.

While the change in leadership came through an unforeseen tragedy, analysts note that Malawian civil society’s early resistance in 2011–2012 was crucial in preventing authoritarian consolidation. The mass protests and continued advocacy signaled that citizens would not passively accept a drift to dictatorship. Political scientist Peter VonDoepp observes that Malawi’s collective resistance arose under conditions favorable to success: intense economic grievances unified the populace, polarization remained relatively low, and civil society organizations enjoyed enough credibility (and allies in institutions like the courts and churches) to mobilize effectively​. In essence, Malawians’ activism created an environment where an autocrat’s power could be checked – either forcing him to reform or ensuring that, if an opportunity for change emerged (as it did in 2012), democracy could resume.

Subsequent events in Malawi have borne out the continued role of checks and balances: for example, in 2019 the judiciary nullified a fraudulent election, echoing the pattern of institutions and civic actors pushing back on executive overreach. The 2011–12 episode stands as a testament to the impact of civil society in safeguarding democracy. It also illustrates that sustained external pressure (such as aid conditionality) can bolster domestic pro-democracy forces – much as Western leverage aided Slovakia in 1998, or international anti-corruption frameworks aided Guatemalans in 2015.

Lessons and Insights

Each of these four cases of early resistance to democratic backsliding offers valuable insights for scholars and practitioners interested in protecting democracy.

Broad Civic Coalitions are Key

In all cases, success depended on building a wide alliance across society. In Slovakia, NGOs united voters across urban/rural and ethnic lines; in South Korea, students, workers, and middle-class professionals coordinated efforts; in Guatemala, disparate social sectors rallied around an anti-corruption cause; and in Malawi, civil society groups spoke with one voice. This breadth conferred legitimacy and strength in numbers, making it harder for incumbents to dismiss the opposition as a narrow faction.

Non-Violent Tactics and Public Legitimacy

The protest movements maintained largely peaceful discipline, which helped attract mass participation and win sympathy at home and abroad. Non-violent pressure – voter education campaigns, street demonstrations, general strikes, etc. – put autocratic leaders in a bind without providing them an easy excuse for a brutal crackdown (and when repression did occur, it backfired). The moral high ground often shifted to the protesters demanding change, eroding the regime’s authority.

Elections as Pivotal Moments

Each case leveraged a key political moment to force change. In Slovakia it was a scheduled election that the opposition and civil society transformed into a referendum on Mečiar’s rule​; in South Korea, the nearing of the Olympics and a succession transition created an opening that protesters exploited; in Guatemala, an upcoming election (later in 2015) meant the regime was vulnerable and elites were looking for stability; in Malawi, the constitutional succession after Mutharika’s death was honored due to internal and external insistence on legality​. Timing and strategic focus – often around elections or transitions – proved crucial in channeling diffuse discontent into concrete political outcomes.

Institutional Allies and International Support

Early resistance is most effective when democratic institutions and international partners lend support. In Slovakia, European Union and U.S. pressure reinforced the message of the civic campaign. In South Korea, some insiders within the ruling party (and tacit U.S. encouragement for stability) helped prompt the June 29 concession. Guatemala’s protesters benefited from the hard evidence provided by the UN’s CICIG and the backing of businesses and the international community in demanding accountability​. In Malawi, courts, churches, and foreign donors played a role in constraining Mutharika’s excesses. These cases show that democratic resistance is not in isolation – connections to judges, election monitors, media, and global normative frameworks can significantly boost the chances of success.

Aftermath – Consolidate the Gains

Perhaps the most sobering lesson is that an initial victory against backsliding is not the end of the story. It must be followed by institutional reforms and continued vigilance. Slovakia’s democratic breakthrough endured and paved the way for EU accession, but faced later challenges from other populists. South Korea navigated a sometimes rocky but ultimately successful consolidation, aided by ongoing civic activism (e.g. the Candlelight Protests of 2016). Guatemala saw regression after 2015 – a reminder that dismantling corruption networks is a long-term battle​. Malawi’s democracy remained fragile, experiencing another major test in 2019 that again required civil society and courts to step up​. In short, early resistance can reset a democratic trajectory, but the deepening of democracy thereafter requires persistent effort and perhaps new leaders who uphold reform promises.

Conclusion

The four case studies – Slovakia, South Korea, Guatemala, and Malawi – demonstrate that even in very different contexts, popular resistance can successfully halt democratic backsliding before it’s too late. Authoritarian-leaning leaders are often most vulnerable in the early stages of consolidation, when civil society still has space to mobilize and institutions have not been completely co-opted.

By understanding the factors behind these success stories, pro-democracy activists and international supporters can better identify when and how to intervene in defense of freedom. These experiences show that history is not linear: determined citizens, armed with courage and organization, can pull their countries back from the brink of autocracy and keep the flame of democracy alive.